

DomPrep Journal

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Special Event Preparedness



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
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
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Editor's Notes

By James D. Hessman, Editor in Chief



In recent years, thanks both to the rapid growth of the 24/7 news cycle and the still accelerating global explosion of instant communications, person-to-person and nation-to-nation, the United States has been both blessed and plagued by the proliferation of such events in recent years.

There are several reasons for this. The NSSEs make the world one (for at least a short time). They attract large crowds--a million people or more to a U.S. presidential inaugural parade, for example, and 100,000 or so at many college football games. And they are very well publicized – before, during, and after the specific event itself.

All of which make the NSSEs particularly attractive targets for terrorists, deranged individuals as well as well organized terror groups. And that grim fact of both life and death in the 21st century requires literally thousands of extra working hours for counterterrorism agencies at every level of government--local and state, as well as national. Healthcare and hazmat agencies, particularly those in the immediate area of a specific NSSE, also must be prepared and, therefore, included in all of the "what if" meetings on the advance planning schedule.

Raphael Barishansky addresses that subject at length in this month's printable issue of DPJ, pointing out that local hospitals and other healthcare facilities, and perhaps hundreds of doctors, nurses, and emergency medical services technicians must be privy to, and well prepared for, all of the worst-case scenarios possible if/when an NSSE goes awry. After-the-fact analyses, studies, and reports are important, but almost meaningless when the what-if becomes reality.

Sophia Paros seconds the motion with her report on how the lessons learned before and during the 2009 Super Bowl (in Tampa, Florida) not only spotlighted deficiencies at that time but also improved the contingency plans for future NSSEs. Joseph Cahill adds a helpful, and budgetarily attractive, suggestion that the Boston Marathon and other one-day events already on the schedule be used, at relatively low cost, as practice or "pre-season" games for the truly major events on the now rather crowded NSSE calendar. Chris Weber joins the chorus with a welcome reminder that "team training" for the same events provides time not only for individual and "traditional" team training but also for the increasingly important cooperative training between and among different teams with different missions. Local police departments and fire departments already are accustomed to working together, of course; but they also must learn to work just as closely with state and federal law-enforcement, emergency-management, and other first-responder agencies and organizations (and vice versa, obviously).

Here it should be noted that the U.S. National Guard has been increasingly involved in homeland-securty missions in recent years, and is likely to be even more deeply engaged far into the foreseeable future. Two other January authors – John Orrell and Thomas Kielbasa – provide additional details in their respective articles on: (a) last month's "Earthquake Conference" in Nashville, Tennessee; and (b) the highly successful certification evaluation of the Guard's newest Civil Support Team – in Clearwater, Florida.

Also included in this month's issue are: (1) A potentially controversial but well-reasoned analysis by Neil Livingstone on an appropriate ending to the painful Julian Assange/Wikileaks assault on U.S. security files; (2) Some helpful recommendations from Roddy Moscoso on the use of simulators to complement and round out other first-responder training; and (3) Four timely reports by Adam McLaughlin on recent homeland-security news and events in the great states of Arizona, California, New Hampshire, and New Jersey.

About the Cover: Football, both college and pro, has been very much in the air – both literally and figuratively – for the last four months, and winds up on 6 February with Super Bowl XLV at Cowboys Stadium in Arlington, Texas. For millions of Americans Super Bowl 45 will be a truly special "Special Event"; for the nation's first responders it translates directly into hundreds of hours of extra work.





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Health/Medical Factors Critical in Pre-Planned Events

By Raphael Barishansky, Public Health



Traditionally, health and medical preparation measures are among the last factors considered when planning a large-scale public event. Law-enforcement concerns and intelligence related to political matters are usually foremost, but this way of thinking does not reflect the historic reality of various events and the numerous, and frequently complex,

preparations by medical and health agencies that also must be factored into the equation. For both practical and operational reasons, a more broad-based approach in the planning for major events is needed and should include institutional components of the various health and medical sectors – more specifically, public health agencies, hospitals, and emergency medical services (EMS) units – that are likely to play an important role in preparing for, responding to, and caring for a major influx of patients when a large-scale event is disrupted by an unforeseen incident or event, natural or manmade.

One of the first questions that must be answered is whether the event will be, or has been, designated as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). If it has been, the event will receive higher visibility and/or political significance. For that reason, an NSSE designation also means that various federal agencies – e.g., the Secret Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) – will play lead roles both in the advance planning and during the course of the specific event.

After the chain of authority has been established, it is the responsibility of all of the entities involved to ensure that they are able to participate fully during the entire planning process for the event. Such participation is especially important for EMS agencies, hospitals, and public health entities. Depending on the size, complexity, and other factors related to the event, planning can begin as early as one year or more prior to the actual event. Following are brief summaries of some, but by no means all, of the more important healthcare, medical, and related information that should be on the short- and long-range checkoff lists.

Hospitals – Beware of the "Worried Well": Hospitals of all sizes should be made aware of any and all large-scale events planned in their immediate geographic and operational areas. The hospital's own advance preparations must ensure that: (a) there are a sufficient number of on-call staff available as well as enough beds and medical supplies to meet surge capacity (or more); and (b) all staff are fully informed on what the EMS system plans to do with incoming patients. It is particularly important not to overwhelm a large trauma center with non-trauma patients. Here it should be remembered that, according to the National Association of County & City Health Officials (NACCHO), the "worried well" usually comprise 80 percent of the people seeking medical care in the aftermath of a major incident or event, and caring for that 80 percent "affects care for the more urgently injured 20 percent."

Another important consideration that will affect the hospitals closest to a large-scale event is the reality that a number of those injured in such incidents frequently bypass the established EMS system and self-transport themselves (or are taken by others) to nearby medical facilities. Several mass-casualty incidents, including a number of New York City hospitals on 11 September 2001, saw that reality verified in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks.

EMS – Geography Matters & Air-Evac Requirements: The

EMS system should be an element of the planning process for all large-scale preplanned events. EMS preparations must include understanding the nature of the event, researching the specific geographical area where the event will occur, knowing the emergency response challenges posed by the geographical location, recognizing the possible need for on-site medical personnel and ambulances, and determining the assistance of basic life-support personnel vs. advanced life-support personnel. In addition, a transport scheme in incidents involving multiple patients is a necessity so as not to overwhelm the medical facilities closest to the event. Other factors to be considered are the possible need for aeromedical resources and/or on-scene physicians familiar with both the EMS system and mass events.

Public Health – ESF #8 in the Field and at the EOC: Because public health entities play a lead role in most DHS/FEMA (Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency) ESF #8 missions, it is imperative that they coordi-

nate their operations, ensure they can communicate with their partners at all times, and are present at all critical meetings. (ESF is federal shorthand for the Emergency Support Functions and responsibilities assigned to DHS and FEMA; ESF #8 covers health and medical matters.)

Another issue that must be addressed is ESF #8 representation at the emergency operations center (EOC). Traditionally, the primary drivers of extensive public health planning for mass gatherings reflect geographic spread, the number of international visitors likely, and event duration as well as, sometimes but not always, various political and religious considerations. In

these instances, the implementation of a formal risk assessment prior to the event, complemented by ongoing daily reviews, is important for identifying public health hazards.

Developing and using event-specific surveillance to provide early-warning systems that address the specific risks identified through the risk-assessment process are essential. The extent to which additional resources are required will vary, and will depend in large part on the current level of surveillance infrastructure. If the existing public health work force has

been regularly trained in emergency response procedures, then far less effort and resources will be needed to prepare for each mass-gathering event. The use of formal emergency management structures and co-location of surveillance and planning operational teams during events facilitates timely communications and action.

The reality is that large-scale events have the potential to generate a large influx of patients, thereby requiring a shift from business as usual to a "surge-capacity" situation. Planning in advance and ensuring that all personnel, equipment, and systems needed are in place ahead of time to handle the possible surge is a paramount planning factor. Fortunately, current training and experience can and should be augmented by using large-scale events already on the calendar to ensure that critical personnel are informed about other critical players, that all plans needed are in place beforehand, and that critical personnel know how to access those plans very quickly.

A more broad-based approach in the planning for major events is needed and should include institutional components of the various health and medical sectors – public health agencies, hospitals, and EMS units – that are likely to play an important role in preparing for, responding to, and caring for a major influx of patients when a large-scale event is disrupted

For additional information about: NACCHO, click on "http://www.naccho.org/topics/modelpractices/database/practice.cfm?practiceID=518"

FEMA's Emergency Support Function #8, click on "http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-08.pdf"

Raphael M. Barishansky, MPH, is currently the Program Chief for Public Health Emergency Preparedness for the Prince George's County (Md.) Department of Health. Prior to establishing himself in this position, he served as Executive Director of the Hudson Valley Regional EMS (Emergency Medical Services) Council, based in Newburgh, N.Y. A regular contributor to various journals, he can be reached at rbarishansky@gmail.com

Pre-Planned Events: An Aid to Preparedness

By Joseph Cahill, EMS



Pre-planned special events provide an excellent opportunity to exercise resources such as the federal government's Incident Command System (ICS) – which is intended to meet a number of goals including but not limited to: (a) maintaining a span

of control so that each leader (at various levels of government) has an adequate, but manageable, number of subordinates; and (b) clearing lines of command so that each individual responder knows to whom he or she should report. The methods for reaching these goals are laid out clearly in this national program so that all responders have the same basic understanding of the structure in use. When a major event or incident occurs and other jurisdictions are called upon for assistance, responders from California to Florida and from Maine to Oregon are familiar with the structure and therefore able to work more closely with one another at the incident scene.

When responders participate in ICS classes, they are given a well planned "typical" scenario and asked to design an ICS structure by using the principles postulated in the ICS guidelines. The benefit of participating in such classes is that students have much more time to devote to their own specific tasks than would be available on a real disaster scene. The preplanned event is similar in that there is ample time to devote to thinking through the ICS structure.

As with most other emergency events, the scope of the ICS system put in place is dictated to a large extent by the actual "event" being managed. Some pre-planned events are fairly large in scope, both in the resources required and in the geographic area covered. One major real-life example is a marathon run such as those held annually in New York City, Boston, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.. These and other marathons almost always generate more than a few patients, felled by exhaustion or for other reasons, at unpredictable intervals over a fairly large geographic area.

Coordination + Cooperation = Confidence

Probably the best known of these long-distance (26 miles plus) runs is the Boston Marathon, which crosses several political jurisdictions – and requires, therefore, that each city and town on the route must coordinate its activities with responders from the other jurisdictions participating. A number of state agencies also provide staff to assist in the effort, thus providing a rare opportunity to actively participate in the "mechanics of coor-

dination" – regional and/or state Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs), for example – and other systems to keep staff fresh and confident with their use.

The EOCs also serve as central locations where representatives of the numerous agencies involved can meet away from the scene and coordinate support for the responders on the ground (or, in this case, at specific posts along the marathon route). The incident continues to be under the control of the incident commander on the scene, but the EOC allows requests for support to be processed away from the numerous distractions and sometimes difficult conditions on the scene.

For emergency managers as well as political decision makers, it is important to remember that many emergency-preparedness grants require testing of the systems paid for by the specific grant involved – often in real time and at full scale. Many of the grants also allow the payee to use real-life situations (the marathons, for example) as tests for the systems. The pre-planned event is in several respects, therefore, the ideal test because it uses real resources in real time – but has ample preparation time to warm up and/or double-check untested systems.

Although this approach may seem not quite as close to a "real life" – i.e., totally unexpected – event as it ideally should be, the reality is that responders have a much better opportunity to become familiar with untested resources *before* they need to implement them while under the pressure of a true emergency event. In short, although the pre-planned event requires additional work and a certain commitment of always scarce resources, careful consideration and planning will allow it to serve more than adequately as a real-life preparedness tool. By sharpening the resources available to them during pre-planned events, responders will be that much more ready for the unplanned event that is lurking somewhere over the horizon of every jurisdiction in the entire country.

Joseph Cahill, a medicolegal investigator for the Massachusetts Office of the Chief Medical Examiner, previously served as exercise and training coordinator for the Massachusetts Department of Public Health, and prior to that was an emergency planner in the Westchester County (N.Y.) Office of Emergency Management. He also served for five years as the citywide advanced life support (ALS) coordinator for the FDNY - Bureau of EMS, and prior to that was the department's Division 6 ALS coordinator, covering the South Bronx and Harlem. Much in demand as a speaker – he has addressed venues as diverse as the national EMS Today conferences and local volunteer EMS agencies – Cahill also served on the faculty of the Westchester County Community College's Paramedic Program and has been a frequent guest lecturer for the U.S. Secret Service, the FDNY EMS Academy, and Montfiore Hospital.

Lessons Learned in Tampa: Special Event Preparedness

By Sophia Paros, Special Events

As political conventions, sports championships, and other mediagathering events become larger and larger, the need for special event planning becomes more important to ensure that event planners and logistics staff – as well as the federal, state, and local agencies that might be involved – are all on the same page.

The city of Tampa, Florida, hosted the National Football League's (NFL) Super Bowl XLIII on 1 February 2009 at Raymond James Stadium. More than 70,000 football fans attended the game, and thousands more participated in the nearly 300 parties, charity events, and other Super Bowl-related activities during the week prior to the game. Because of the magnitude of the event, and the opportunity it provided to potential terrorists, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security designated Super Bowl XLIII as a "National Special Security Event (NSSE)." Reportedly, 55 local, state, and federal agencies participated in the security operations for the event, along with a number of private-sector representatives. Among the agencies known to have been participating were the Tampa fire, police, and public works departments as well as the city's Office of Emergency Management, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Tampa International Airport.

Prior to Super Bowl XLIII, the Tampa Office of Emergency Management recognized that a full-scale exercise (FSE) could be used to test each special-event agency's preparedness for the game, and decided that college football's Outback Bowl, also hosted by Tampa, offered that opportunity. The details are included in *Special Event Planning: Conducting a Full-Scale Exercise Prior to a Special Event* Lessons Learned – available on *Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov)* – which explains how exercise planners developed a supplementary exercise scenario to engage federal, state, and local personnel (not only those deployed in the field, but also others assigned to the Multi-Agency Coordination Center, or MACC).

The carefully detailed scenario allowed the special-event agencies involved to conduct game-day operations while also responding to exercise injects. The purpose of the Outback Bowl FSE was to prepare for Super Bowl game-day operations, with a team of evaluators present, to identify capability gaps and/or areas for improvement well prior to the start of the Super Bowl itself.

One Opportunity Delayed, But Later Resurrected

According to the Tampa Bay Regional Public Safety Sub-Committee Super Bowl XLIII After-Action Report, also available on *Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov)*, the FSE provided an excellent opportunity for the city of Tampa and its partnering agencies to test their unified command, coordination, and communication plans for Super Bowl XLIII. The same report also identified areas – e.g., the need for a text message alert system – that could make communications during a special event both more efficient and more reliable.

During the pre-Super Bowl XLIII activities, several situations developed that validated the need for prompt dissemination of timely information to attendees. For example, when a large tent caught fire in the NFL Experience, event personnel had to communicate information to attendees in person; meanwhile, Tampa Police Department public information officers posted an incident notification about the fire on the Super Bowl website.

Both of those actions proved successful, but a text alert system could have made the dissemination of accurate information to attendees both faster and easier. Somewhat ironically, the Tampa Bay special event planners had considered, prior to Super Bowl XLIII, developing a text message alert system that would allow attendees to sign up for Super Bowl-related text alerts – e.g., important information related to road closures, event hours, and incident notifications. However, the city did not have the infrastructure in place to establish the text message alert system in time for Super Bowl XLIII.

Following Super Bowl XLIII, however, the city of Tampa developed a new "Alert Tampa" text messaging system to disseminate emergency notifications and other information to subscribers. Among these notifications and alerts will be mandatory evacuation orders and re-entry authorizations as well as timely information about emerging crime patterns, street closures, and service-day changes. The city of Tampa is now planning to develop a special event text message notification system within the Alert Tampa infrastructure for the 2012 National Republican Convention.

For additional information on the Lessons Learned reports mentioned above, and on special event planning in general, log into LLIS.gov at www.llis.dhs.gov.

Sophia Paros is an outreach analyst for Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency's national online network of lessons learned, best practices, and innovative ideas for the nation's homeland-security and emergency-response communities. She received a dual bachelor's degree in Computer Information Systems and Business from the College of Notre Dame of Maryland and is currently working on an M.S. in Information Security from The George Washington University.

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Working Together - More Than Just Protecting a Venue

By Chris Weber, Fire/HazMat



Terrorists have repeatedly indicated that they are interested in striking targets with the potential for a large number of casualties and/or significant economic damage. Three characteristics of such events make them particularly desirable targets:

(a) their predictability (because advance scheduling is mandatory); (b) the large number of attendees expected; and (c) comparatively weak security.

Sporting venues are especially attractive to terrorists because of the extraordinarily large number of spectators in attendance and the live television coverage they often attract – the University of Michigan's stadium, for example, which has the capacity to seat well over 110,000 people. This combination fulfills the two primary criteria that terrorists consider ideal for a successful attack: (a) a large number of casualties; and (b) significant publicity.

For successful venue protection, a wide variety of equipment and skills are required. Venue protection is a complex task, and requires the special capabilities of many agencies at every stage – during the planning and surveillance phases, to begin with, and in response to emergency incidents. The specific tasks and responsibilities required include such varied

activities as: crowd control (by law-enforcement agencies); the treatment, triage, and transport of casualties (by emergency medical services (EMS) units); specialty operations such as explosives sweeps (by EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) teams); and continuous air monitoring (by hazmat teams). Although most of those units carry out their individual tasks admirably, planning and execution often fall short when different agencies are required to coordinate their responses — which is usually the case.

To optimize the level of interoperability, venue protection at regularly scheduled events provides the perfect opportunity to repeatedly hone the skills required in multiagency coordination and cooperation. Public safety agencies have struggled for decades, though, and not always successfully, to improve

their multiagency coordination. There are, of course, many reasons for this – e.g., jurisdictional battles, agency rivalries, and politics. One widely publicized situation was the conflict between Fire Department New York (FDNY) and the New York Police Department (NYPD) after the tragic 9/11 attacks.

No Single Agency Has All the Answers

Most tasks carried out by individual agencies are already rather specialized, both in equipment and in training. This specialization makes it virtually impossible, though, for any single agency to adequately complete all of the tasks likely to be assigned following a major incident. One example is the "continuous air monitoring" previously mentioned, which is designed to rapidly detect five general hazards: (a) radiation; (b) corrosive gases and vapors; (c) oxygen; (d)

flammable gases and vapors; and (e) toxic gases and vapors.



That type of monitoring requires not only a relatively complicated array of equipment but also frequent and highly specialized training in its operation and maintenance (as well as the interpretation of results). Hazardous materials response teams spend much of their budget, and considerable effort, in maintaining their air-monitoring proficiency. The same goes for

EOD teams, especially when the purchase and use of advanced robots and personal protective equipment are factored into the equation. The shorthand truth is that every agency likely to be involved in a response operation relies on several other agencies to perform such essential tasks as explosives sweeps, the detection of chemical hazards, and mass decontamination operations.

It is imperative, of course, that each agency has the ability to carry out its own specifically designated responsibilities. However, its ability to do so is often contingent on the ability of another agency to carry out its own specifically designated tasks. Hazmat teams rely on EOD teams, for example, to neutralize improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and the EOD teams rely on the hazmat specialists to deal with other chemical

hazards. The problem arises when both hazards may be present simultaneously. Without frequent and realistic drills and exercises, the operational deficiencies, if any, of each team – or both teams – cannot be detected.

Many jurisdictions apparently believe that the current level of multiagency coordination is already acceptable. However, these same jurisdictions, fortunately, have seldom if ever had to subject that belief to a real-life test. Those jurisdictions that have seen examples of multiagency coordination in actual operation, though,

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have often discovered catastrophic failures. Two prominent examples are the lack of expected outside resources during Hurricane Katrina, and the communication failures during and following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Among the other pitfalls of multiagency coordination are various operational and political "turf wars," communications failures, the lack of equipment interoperability, and what might best be described as "cultural differences."

Effective Multiagency Coordination the **Product of Joint Training**

Multiagency emergency response plans often do not take into account the need for a reasonable staging of resources. At least one public safety agency, at a fairly large college sporting venue, pre-positions its mass decontamination equipment inside the stadium fence during games. The equipment might be – for a

number of reasons – all but useless during or after an actual hazardous materials or WMD (weapons of mass destruction) release. Those reasons include, but are not limited to: (a) the chaos that would likely occur within the stadium; (b) a lack of the secure space needed to deploy the decontamination equipment; and (c) the probability of chemical contamination of both the equipment and the deployment area.

A number of other agencies that rely on these mass decontamination capabilities might easily be caught off guard. It is essential, therefore, to ensure that resources are put to their optimum use, not only to systematically analyze current response plans but also to coordinate them with all of the agencies – both public and private sector – likely to be involved.

There are three keys to ensure successful multiagency coordination both before and during events requiring venue protection: (a) the development and promulgation of joint standard operating procedures; (b) the conduct of joint training; and (c) the scheduling and conduct of joint exercises and drills – preferably at the specific venue likely to be the target. Regrettably, most jurisdictions have only one

> of these "pieces of the puzzle" already in place – typically, joint exercises, which are usually federally mandated (in which

case the potential problems of interoperability are often minimized). A lack of regular joint training is often

the result of funding shortages – primarily because of the overtime costs incurred during regular training. But that should be no excuse for leaving the community without the capabilities necessary to deal with the complex problems caused by hazmat and WMD incidents.

Fortunately, the multiagency coordination skills practiced during regularly scheduled events at most venues – e.g., college or professional football or baseball stadiums, basketball courts, and ice hockey arenas – are readily translated to other complex events and pay great dividends over time. Working together -now- to protect the public at such regularly

scheduled events will translate directly into better and more effective preparations, protection, and coordination when a hazmat or WMD incident occurs in the future.

Chris Weber runs the training and consulting firm Dr. Hazmat Inc. and serves as a subject matter expert with the Longmont, Colorado, HazMat Team. His past experience includes serving on the Washtenaw County (Michigan) HazMat Team for over a decade, including a tour as deputy director. Weber has been a firefighter for over 20 years and has extensive experience involving hazardous-materials chemistry; he also holds a Ph.D. in Biological Chemistry from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He is the author of "Pocket Reference for Hazardous Materials Response" (Brady/Pearson) and has written specialized chapters of several other books.



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Air Guard Strengthens Stance for Homeland Defense, Civil Support

By John Orrell, National Guard



The 2010 Domestic Operations Equipment Requirements (DOERs) conference prompted the Air National Guard (ANG) to position itself to provide an even stronger stance for its future homeland-defense and civil-support missions. The

ANG bases its equipment requirements on the National Guard's (NG) "Essential 10," which for operational purposes is a list of the 10 essential missions – joint-force headquarters command & control, civil support teams, maintenance, aviation, engineer, medical, communications, transportation, security, and logistics – that the NG is responsible for during and in the aftermath of a domestic emergency event.

Following in-depth discussions with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), what is referred to as the "Essential 10" Equipment Requirements – i.e., the equipment items that every state needs when it has to respond to a natural disaster – has morphed into a unified National Response Framework plan and emergency support functions construct. This process helps ensure that all responders are "on the same page."

The finished product of the DOERs conference was what is called the 2011 "DOERs book" – which, among other things, is used to inform the Air Force's senior leadership about the ANG's homeland-defense and civil-support requirements. In the words of Air Force Colonel Jon Mott, the DOERs book provides "a fiscally unconstrained look at whatever our requirements are. It's not an unfunded requirements request. It's not a budget document. ... It documents what our requirements are from the field perspective."

"A Unique and Much-Needed Partner"

The DOERs process, including an annual conference and publication of an associated requirements book, is the cornerstone of a vision that will help equip and posture the ANG as a unique and much needed partner to civil agencies in times of domestic distress. In 2010, the second annual DOERs Conference hosted more than 460 military and civilian attendees representing all 54 states and territories and the District of Columbia as well as representatives from both FEMA and DHS.

The conference goal, as spelled out in the DOERs book, was to define and document ANG capability shortfalls in the field of domestic operations. ANG field experts identified critical capabilities, based specifically on the NRF eight-key scenario sets, by drawing on their own vast pool of experience and an understanding of the domestic mission at the local, state, and regional levels. The end result (again, in Mott's words) "allows for an easier discussion of ANG capabilities and needs in the context of the [DHS]/FEMA construct. ... Posturing of National Guard resources across FEMA regions facilitates rapid access to critical consequence-management capabilities, and fits perfectly with FEMA's new 'Whole of Nation' framework for catastrophic planning and response."

A "State/FEMA matrix" included in the book specifically identifies the individual states and FEMA regions projected to receive critical capability resources, and further distinguishes how some capabilities are required in each state – while others are needed within each FEMA region to support a region-only and/or national response. The remaining sections of the book focus primarily on the specific emergency-support functions tabs, which include information related to each required capability classified as "critical" – meaning that it must be in place in less than three years.

The "Earthquake Workshop" And Validated Capabilities

Complementing and supporting the preceding effort was the first-ever "New Madrid Seismic Zone Resource Allocation Workshop" – hosted by FEMA and the National Emergency Management Association in Nashville, Tennessee. The key shortfalls identified by state emergency-management authorities at the workshop, which ran from 30 November through 3 December 2010, almost mirror the capability needs identified at the last two DOERs conferences. The fact that "the DOERs process is producing ... a validated capabilities process that supports our nation's communities in times of greatest need ... is great news," Mott said, "and allows for an easier discussion of ANG capabilities and needs in the context of the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA construct."

The DOERs book also addresses how ongoing overseas commitments and expanding domestic responsibilities for the ANG, in conjunction with increased awareness from political leaders, make it essential to maintain focus on the strategy developed to improve the ANG's support to civil

authorities. A related Department of Defense directive includes significant provisions for increasing the influence of the National Guard in matters of support to civil authorities. That directive, together with the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, forms the foundation for a robust ANG strategy for the National Guard.

"While the 2009 Domestic Operations Equipment Requirements Conference produced a book categorized under eight emergency support functions, the inclusion of incident awareness and assessment for the 2010 [DOERs] conference has expanded the list to 10," said Air Force Lieutenant General Harry M. Wyatt III, director of the Air National Guard. "Another conference improvement this year was the appointment of emergency support functions chairs and vice-chairs ... [who] provided an in-depth ANG enterprise-wide out-brief, identifying over 50 critical material capability gaps and over 40 critical non-material issues."

Identifying Future as Well as Current Needs

In 2009, according to Mott, this field-driven process identified almost \$600 million in equipment requirements, of which \$30 million had already been earmarked to support domestic operations. At the 2010 conference, it was determined that an estimated \$672 million still would be needed to respond to the increased homeland-defense and civil-support missions. Warfighters have affirmed that that is the amount they need to respond to a manmade or natural disaster in the local communities, states, or FEMA regions. The funds needed will be requested through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA) legislative process.

The NGREA appropriations received a significant increase following Hurricane Katrina, when the Air Guard realized that it had to replace and modernize much of its major equipment items. Prior to 2006, the NGREA was used primarily for keeping the Guard's major weapons systems both modernized and relevant. After 2006, emergency appropriations (\$200 million) were allocated to replace the specific equipment items needed at that time. Then the National Defense Authorization Act language was changed to allow NGREA funding to be used. To date, a total of \$740 million in NGREA appropriations – i.e., the initial \$200 million plus an additional \$540 million allocated over the past five years – have been used for modernization missions, homeland defense, and civil support, providing much improved capabilities for the Guard's warfighting and disaster-response missions.

The 2011 approach will be focused on expanding efforts in: (a) outlining the ANG strategy for domestic operations; (b) widening the audience to include more joint participation; and (c) strengthening linkages to the civil support team through use of the emergency support functions framework. As a fully integrated member of the NG team, the ANG's responsibility to civil authorities will be to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate property damage to the greatest extent possible. The dual role of the ANG in defending U.S. interests abroad, as well as ensuring safety and security at home, has become more visible to the American people as a result of the many one-time as well as recurring natural and manmade disasters that have occurred in the past several years.

As General Wyatt affirmed in the book, this is an important document related to and supporting the ANG's homeland response mission, "Our emergency support functions' chairs and vice-chairs, and the Air National Guard functional area managers, have come together and taken passionate ownership of this field-driven process, producing a document that they all can truly be proud of. ... It has been said that being lucky is really where preparation meets opportunity and this ... will provide the Air National Guard a proactive way to discover many opportunities to serve the citizens of this great country, through a deliberate and methodical approach to determine field-driven requirements."

For additional information on:

- (a) The "Essential 10 Equipment Requirements," click on: "http://www.ng.mil/ll/Publications/FY09%20Budget%20 Card%20Info/FY09%20Essential%2010.pdf";
- (b) The 2011 DOERs book, click on: "http://www.ng.mil/ll/Publications/2011%20DOER%20On%20Line.pdf".

Technical Sergeant John Orrell is a staff writer and photojournalist at the National Guard Bureau whose duties are focused principally on the missions of the National Guard both domestically and worldwide. He enlisted in the Air Force in November 2001, and in 2004 enlisted with the Air National Guard (ANG), serving with the Air National Guard's 126th Air Refueling Wing (ARW), Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. In 2008, he cross-trained into the public affairs career field to be a journalist and served with the 126th ARW until August 2010, when he moved to the National Guard Bureau in Arlington, Virginia. He now works for the National Guard Bureau Public Affairs' Command Information Division. The preceding article by Sergeant Orrell has been adapted, with permission, from the National Guard's 13 December 2010 web posting on http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2010/12/121310-support.aspx.

Should U.S. 'Take Out' Julian Assange?

By Neil C. Livingstone, Ph.D., Viewpoint



The answer to the question posed above is that Assange is the symptom, not the cause. The real villain in this drama is SPC Bradley Manning, the 22-year old U.S. Army intelligence analyst who is reported to have been the source of the thousands

of classified U.S. government documents that Assange released to the public. Manning, who has been arrested, is said to regard himself as a "whistle blower," not a spy.

It seems clear, though, that Manning could and should be charged with treason under provisions of the Espionage Act of 1917, Section 2a, which provides that, "Whosoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another to communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, note instrument, appliance, or information relating

to the national defense, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty years."


However, if any of these offenses are committed in wartime, the punishment can be increased, according to the Act, to include the death penalty. Inasmuch as the United States is presently engaged in two wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, in which young men and women in uniform are dying, it would appear that Manning's crimes would and should qualify for the death penalty. (It is recognized that many people are opposed to the death penalty per se for any crime, no matter how heinous. That is their opinion, and they are free to express it; but that is not the issue here.)

During the Cold War, foreign spies rarely were executed by the United States. Instead, they were traded for U.S. spies and/or human-rights activists held by Moscow, most often at Checkpoint Charlie in divided Berlin. Americans caught spying for the Soviet Union and its allies were not executed, with the exception of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who passed on information about the atomic bomb to Moscow. Even members of the infamous Walker spy ring and those like Ronald Pelton, Aldrich Ames, and Robert Hanssen cheated the "hangman" because U.S. authorities believed

Medical Countermeasures for Large-Scale Biological Attacks Report

A distinguished former special assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Senior Director for Biological Defense Policy asks some extremely difficult questions about the nation's ability to cope with biological and/or chemical attacks. The replies – from DomPrep 40 members and DPJ readers at large – are not merely disappointing and disturbing, but absolutely alarming. Question: What can and should be done to reduce the impact of what many citizens believe is now the greatest danger facing the nation as a whole?

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it was more important to fully debrief them and learn what they gave up to the enemy than to exact retribution.

In contrast, Private Manning has nothing of value to trade for his life. The U.S. government, and the American people, already know what he did – and there are no mysteries about how he did it. If found guilty – after an abundantly fair trial, of course – he should be summarily executed as an example to all, especially any other person contemplating the same kind of treason, to demonstrate, conclusively and for all time, that there is a price to be paid for selling out your country. To do anything less would be to make light of the damage that Manning has caused.

As for Assange, it is interesting that one of the articles posted on his behalf attacks the Espionage Act as "a huge danger to our open society." That article* was written by Robert Meeropol, the Rosenbergs' son, who claims that the U.S. government's embrace of the Espionage Act "threatens every left-wing activist." Well, one should hope so, in the case of any activist guilty of crimes of the same magnitude as Manning's.

As to what should be done to Assange, in the best of all worlds he perhaps would be hit by a bus as he crosses a London street. But barring that happy coincidence, he should be arrested and tried, if possible, on charges relating to the illegal publication of classified information, which is also addressed in the Espionage Act. However, there is no certainty he would be convicted on such charges because: (a) He is not an American citizen; and (b) The Espionage Act was written nearly a hundred years ago and did not envision the worldwide web, or other contemporary methods of information dissemination, but was focused more on traditional publication outlets. Moreover, he clearly would not meet the generally accepted definition of a spy. But he obviously did know that the information he was releasing to the public was highly sensitive and not only could damage the United States (of which he reportedly has a visceral hatred), but also possibly even result in the deaths of U.S. allies and non-American informants abroad.

Another strategy that has been discussed might be to declare Assange an "enemy combatant" and seize him, whenever and wherever possible, and then incarcerate him indefinitely at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay.

Not incidentally, Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-Conn.) has introduced new legislation to clarify and strengthen both the language and the penalties relating to the publication of classified intelligence information. The legislation is entitled, appropriately enough, the Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Law Dissemination (SHIELD) Act.

Finally, it also seems obvious that the Pentagon is in many respects the other "real culprit" in this case. The very fact that, according to credible reports, an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 people had access to the same State Department materials that Manning had – and with little or no discernible need to view those materials – qualifies as incompetence of the first order, as does the equally appalling fact that those materials could so easily be downloaded.

Heads should roll – quite a few of them, and starting at the highest level. Anyone who thinks that judgment too harsh should ask himself (or herself) if a corporate CEO would be permitted to stay on the job after he lost all of his company's trade secrets because he had been so careless or disengaged that he did not monitor the company's IT security and/or hold subordinates accountable when it came to securing the company's data? His stockholders and board of directors would demand his ouster. Senior Army officials, military as well as civilian, should perhaps take note and resign – and consider themselves lucky to get off so lightly.

In his public statements, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates himself has been far too gentle about the Wikileaks disclosures, passing them off as "embarrassing" and "awkward," but also suggesting that they had, at best, only a "modest" impact on U.S. foreign policy. That, of course, is not the point. The real issues are Manning's treason and the military's failure to adequately protect the classified information in its possession. Surely the Secretary of Defense must find those issues more than slightly troubling and should therefore, at the very least, acknowledge a major failure of leadership within his department.

*Robert Meeropol, "My Parents Were Executed Under the Unconstitutional Espionage Act – Here's Why We Must Fight to Protect Julian Assange," Current TV, 29 December 2010.


Dr. Neil C. Livingstone, chairman and CEO of Executive Action LLC and an internationally respected expert in terrorism and counterterrorism, homeland defense, foreign policy, and national security, has written nine books and more than 200 articles in those fields. A gifted speaker as well as writer, he has made more than 1300 television appearances, delivered over 500 speeches both in the United States and overseas, and testified before Congress on numerous occasions. He holds three Masters Degrees as well as a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was the founder and, prior to assuming his present post, CEO of GlobalOptions Inc.



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Simulation Training for First Responders

Using Virtual Worlds to Plan for Real World Challenges

A distinction must

be made, though -

namely, that, although

simulators have a long

and successful history

in training individuals, a

somewhat different type

of virtual world must be

used to simultaneously

train the groups that

make up a team

By Rodrigo (Roddy) Moscoso, Law Enforcement



Immersive training simulation software has been used for decades, most notably in the military and commercial airline sectors. By using state-of-the-art hardwareand software-enabled "virtual" environments, pilots can train for almost every operational situation they are

likely to encounter, ranging from instrument-only landings to major equipment failures. NASA's use of high-tech simulated environments in astronaut training has been a legendary success and was limited only by the imagination of the trainers and engineers who created a never-ending stream of "worst case" scenarios for which U.S. astronauts have had to prepare.

There have been other outstanding success stories, in the same field, that cumulatively prove the value of this type of training and, not incidentally, have been validated by the successful resolution of a broad spectrum of real-world incidents. A distinction must be made, though – namely, that, although simulators have a long and successful history in training individuals, a somewhat different type of virtual world must be used to simultaneously train the groups that make up a team. Group training would be particularly useful, in fact, to prepare a large number of first responders – representing a broad spectrum of agencies and disciplines – for working together when a major incident occurs.

Typically, interactive training for first responders involves scripted real-world exercises that include numerous volunteers

playing, for example, the role of "victims" of a mass-casualty event. These exercises can be invaluable in testing response procedures, improving role clarity, and enhancing multi-agency coordination. However, such exercises also can be very costly. Moreover, they usually require months of planning, the use of heavy equipment, and close coordination not only among participants but the general public as well. Also, because the damaging of real property is frequently involved, the expenses can add up quickly.

Two additional problems that must be taken into account are:
(a) the fact that such training often poses a danger – to trainees and volunteers alike; and (b) that many and probably most exercises usually train only a fraction of a participating agency's response personnel at a time.

Three-Dimensional Environments & Unscripted Scenarios

Fortunately, the development and introduction of multiplayer online "gaming" provides a useful model for creating "virtual world" incidents that can serve as excellent training platforms. Companies such as the Environmental

Tectonics Corporation, for example, have built upon their expertise in training pilots to create an "Advanced Disaster Management Simulator" – which is designed specifically for incident management training and is particularly useful for incident commanders. By creating three-dimensional environments, realistic in appearance, groups of trainees can practice their responses to natural or manmade disasters, in real time, through the use of open-ended, unscripted scenarios.

One of the principal advantages provided by the Environmental Tectonics system is that training simulations can be "replayed" afterward: (a) to review the successes achieved, and/or failures suffered, during a given session; and (b) to collect feedback from participants. The same scenarios

can be tested repeatedly at any time, with additional agency participants involved, thereby creating – when compared to a traditional real-world exercise – a more cost-effective, and sustainable, training model.

The University of Maryland's Center for Advanced Transportation Technology Lab (CATT Lab) has developed a multiplayer gaming interface designed specifically to train first responders representing multiple disciplines. By using the UM system, which is focused on a "first-person" perspective and is acces-



sible from any computer, participants can move around the virtual world independently, interacting with other participants – including virtual victims – at their discretion.

Moreover, the users are – like those involved in multiplayer online gaming – geospatially aware of their individual locations within the virtual environment and can communicate with one another by using live audio based on their own location compared to the locations of the other users. If one user is not "physically" close to another participant in the virtual world, he or she cannot hear that other person during the simulation. Communication via simulated radio is also available in the virtual environment – but can be deliberately "disabled" during an exercise to simulate a loss of communications in the real world.

Simulation: It's the Real Thing!

The CATT Lab system also incorporates other virtual components that mimic real-world scenarios. For example, during an incident involving a roadway, simulated traffic will start to back up, creating a situation that requires action from the appropriate responders. In addition – thanks to an artificial intelligence engine built into the program – fire, liquid spills, and gases all spread in the same way they would in real life. The solution allows participants to easily change roles, giving a police officer the ability,

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for example, to serve as a firefighter during a specifically designated scenario.

These and similar types of exercises can not only improve situational awareness among participants but also create a greater appreciation of the roles and responsibilities of responders representing other disciplines. Another design feature allows completed scenarios to be replayed from different viewing angles for each responder, giving assessors a more complete picture of each participant's role in the exercise.

Although a missing element in simulation-based training is a true, real-world test of physical equipment – and is not, therefore, a substitute for training on specific apparatus – the use of multiplayer virtual environments provides enormous benefits to first responders and command staff alike. When the next generation of responders – most of whom are already familiar with the intricacies of multiplayer gaming systems – enters the emergency management field, the use of this innovative technology is likely to become even more valuable.

For additional information on the UMD CATT Lab solution, click on http://tinyurl.com/2r3d6o.

Rodrigo (Roddy) Moscoso currently serves as Communications Manager for the Capital Wireless Information Net (CapWIN) Program at the University of Maryland. Formerly with IBM Business Consulting Services, he has over 15 years of experience supporting large-scale IT implementation projects, and extensive experience in several related fields such as change management, business process reengineering, human resources, and communications.

Florida's Second Civil Support Team Passes Initial Evaluation

By Thomas Kielbasa, National Guard



The National Guard's newest civil support team (CST) passed its first evaluation last month, bringing it one step closer to being Florida's second fully accredited team capable of responding to WMD (weapons of mass destruction) incidents.

The 48th CST, based in Clearwater, Florida, was evaluated on 16 December by specialists from the U.S. Northern Command during a day-long exercise at a Florida National Guard aviation facility in Brooksville (on Florida's west coast). The 22-person 48th, which is composed of full-time soldiers and airmen, is designed to assist emergency first responders during incidents involving chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) threats.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph DeFee, USA, the 48th CST commander, last month's evaluation was his unit's first "real chance" to prove that it is ready for full accreditation by the Department of Defense. If the 48th CST is certified as a "fully mission capable" CST, it would be the 57th such unit in the nation and the second in Florida. "Other than a real-world response, this is probably the most important exercise we'll have," DeFee said while watching his team members prepare for the evaluation.

The scenario was real enough, he added, to keep the participants on their toes, and also relatively simple: A small airplane was seen flying over Brooksville dispersing a liquid of

some type. After people under the flight path started getting sick, the police were able to track the plane to a local airstrip. When the first responders found suspicious chemicals and materials near the plane, they called in the Florida National Guard's 48th CST.

An 'Artificial' Assist for a Real-World Test

Using a military C-23 Sherpa to simulate the chemical-laden plane, the evaluation team kept close watch over members of the 48th throughout the day as they were scanning the area for possible CBR agents. Some team members then took samples and tried to determine what toxins may have been spread from the plane. Lead evaluator Ronald Jones, deputy director of Civil Support Readiness Group-East for U.S. Army North, noted that the scenario was kept as realistic as possible to

ensure the Guardsmen know their jobs. "The only part that is somewhat artificial," he said, "is that we test their capability to detect chemical and biological and radiological hazards, which you probably would not see a terrorist use all at one time."

The search for all three types of potential hazards, he continued, was "because we wanted to make sure that all of the team's detection gear works, and they [the team members] have the ability to use it." The public "can be assured," he commented, "that the National Guard is prepared."

The 48th CST was created in February 2010, but not all of the team's members are new to the CST concept. Three of its current members – including DeFee – came from its sister unit, the 44th CST based in North Florida; two other members came from CST units in New York and Arizona.

After his unit receives official certification from the Department of Defense, DeFee said, it will be kept on a 24-7 alert for real-world emergencies. It is important to have two CSTs in Florida, he added, both to cut the length of response times to incidents and to provide more well trained specialists for possible missions. "Historically," he noted, "the Guard has been here to protect the citizens of Florida, and those citizens need to know that the Guard is here to respond to any future threats.

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"Considering the philosophy of General Titshaw [Air Force Major General Emmett Titshaw, Adjutant General of Florida] of 'Linking our Heritage to our Horizons," DeFee summarized, "we will continue that heritage of protection against any threats."

U.S. Air Force Master Sergeant Thomas Kielbasa is a Public Affairs Specialist assigned to the Florida National Guard Public Affairs Office in St. Augustine, Florida. Kielbasa joined the U.S. Army in 1991, serving first in the 82nd Airborne Division and the New York National Guard as a Fire Support Specialist. After earning a Bachelor of Arts degree in Journalism in 1997, he worked as a civilian newspaper reporter. In 2001, he became a full-time Public Affairs Specialist with the Florida National Guard, and served as the editor of the quarterly Florida Guardsman magazine and its companion website, the Florida Guardsman Online. He is a frequent contributor of news photographs to National Guard and Department of Defense publications and websites. The preceding article is adapted with permission from the National Guard's 17 December 2010 web posting "http://www.ng.mil/news/archives/2010/12/122010-evaluation.aspx."

California, New Jersey, Arizona, and New Hampshire

By Adam McLaughlin, State Homeland News



<u>California</u> Pipeline Safety Task Force Seeks To Prevent "Another San Bruno"

According to the conclusions of a 130-member task force on pipeline safety sponsored by the federal Department of Transportation's Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, the deadly gas pipeline explosion in San Bruno several months ago was the result of, among other things, a lack of planning and, more specifically, inadequate communications between and among utility companies, local governments, builders, and homeowners – not only in California but nationwide.

The report, issued in late December, devotes considerable space to emphasizing the importance of petroleum products to the nation's transportation, energy, heating, defense, and commercial economy. The authors of the report also provide, though, a helpful set of guidelines and "recommended practices" to prevent future catastrophes like the San Bruno blaze – which killed eight people, injured many others, and leveled 38 homes. The recommendations include: (a) requiring local governments to obtain or create maps of all transmission lines in areas where development might take place; and (b) requiring utilities to coordinate with developers on projects planned near transmission lines. Also included are measures to speed emergency response and evacuation measures in the event of a leak or explosion.

The recommendations are not mandates per se. Local governments can choose which, if any, guidelines to implement, according to Carl Weimer, executive director of the Pipeline Safety Trust. "Until now," San Bruno City Manager Connie Jackson added in an e-mail, "city regulations would only assure that a pipeline being placed in the ground is located inside an easement in any location where they are not on property owned by the utility company."

Lawmakers and utilities are studying pipeline-safety technology such as "smart pigs" – i.e., robotic devices that inspect the integrity of a transmission line. In the meantime, a structure for improved communications can prevent another tragedy, the report's authors suggest.

One of the more interesting recommendations in the 23 December report is that pipelines be boldly identified with markers – this recommendation was included despite the fact that many in San Bruno apparently did not make a connection between the bright yellow stripes along the pipelines and the fact that the stripes indicated a potential hazard.

For additional information about the 9 September San Bruno explosion, click on: (a) "http://danville.patch.com/columns/back-from-the-ashes-the-rebuilding-of-crestmoor"; (b) "http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/PIPA.htm"; and/or (c) http://www.pstrust.org/

New Jersey CAP Wing Conducts Anti-Terrorist Training Exercise

The New Jersey Wing of the Civil Air Patrol (CAP) conducted an extensive homeland security disaster training exercise based in the general aviation area of Trenton-Mercer Airport in Ewing early last month. The initial scenario for the exercise was the simulated explosion of 10 terrorist bombs at critical infrastructure sites throughout the state – including several bridges, a dam, rail lines, an electric generating station, a power transmission line, and a ferry terminal. Initial casualties were estimated in the scenario at 2,000-plus dead and more than 4,700 injured.

The exercise plan included activation of the New Jersey State Police Incident Command Center at the Regional Operations Center (ROC) in West Trenton. Major Kurt Pricer, director of operations of the New Jersey CAP Wing, was assigned to man the CAP desk at the Center. Satellite command posts were established at three strategic airports in the same general area, including Trenton-Mercer. Forty-two CAP personnel took part in the training exercise.

The Trenton-Mercer incident command staff initially fielded an eight-man ground disaster relief team led by Captain Robert Cann, a resident of Sayreville, who was supported by First Lieutenant David Lee, a resident of Millstone. They, along with other CAP cadet and officer personnel, carried out a reconnaissance of the Gilbert Generating Station in Riegelsville that had reportedly suffered significant

damage from the explosion of two bombs. The ground team also provided support for local authorities activated at other bomb explosion sites, according to the press release.

Five air crews, including pilots and photo observers, were dispatched in CAP aircraft, flown in from other airports to Trenton-Mercer, to carry out photo reconnaissance of all 10 terrorist bombing sites and perform other air-based homeland security tasks. The incident commander for the homeland se-


curity training operations was CAP Major John Paul, a resident of Hillsborough; staff member Lieutenant Colonel Steven M. Tracy, a resident of Jackson, monitored the exercise for operational correctness. Captain Eric Cohen, a resident of Asbury Park, served as safety and logistics officer.

The Civil Air Patrol, an official auxiliary of the U.S. Air Force, is a nonprofit organization with 58,000 members nationwide. CAP units perform 90 percent of continental U.S. inland search-and-rescue missions, as and when tasked by the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center, and were credited with saving more than 100 lives in fiscal year 2009. More than 1,800 members volunteered 8,000 hours of their time during the Hurricane Katrina disaster relief operations. CAP volunteers also perform homeland-security, disaster-relief, and counter-drug missions at the request of federal, state, and local agencies. The members also play a leading role in aerospace education and serve as mentors to more than 28,000 young people throughout the country who are currently participating in CAP cadet programs.

Arizona County Officials Consider Widening Background Check Authority

In an effort to both protect children and address threats to critical infrastructure, the Pima County, Arizona, Board of Supervisors approved preliminary language, on 4 January 2011, that would allow

county agencies to fingerprint employees without first receiving special permission from the board. If passed, the proposed ordinance would give department heads the authority to require employees to be fingerprinted and go through background checks. The language would apply: (a) to current and prospective employees, contractors, and volunteers who interact with minors and vulnerable adults; and (b) those who have access to critical infrastructure, significant financial resources, and/or sensitive information, facility locations, and equipment.



"The documented increased threats to critical infrastructure, as well as increasing awareness of the risks associated with the county's fiduciary and operational responsibilities, result in the need to perform more in-depth background checks for those individuals performing specific jobs that involve access to certain vulnerable individuals, restricted information, or critical locations," Pima County Administrator C. H. Huckelberry wrote in a memo recommending the language in the drafted ordinance.

"Administrative rules implementing the ordinance would establish the types of jobs or circumstances that would require background checks and fingerprint collection," said John Moffatt, director of the county's Office of Strategic Technology Planning. In addition to state law, Moffatt said, there are several other factors involved, such as the expansion of what is considered critical infrastructure and the increased number of county employees, including the technology staff, who have access to sensitive information and locations.

"We had a situation where we are having more and more of the information technology [IT] folks who have access to critical data, yet the state law did not enable – or did not require – background checks on the IT organization," Moffatt pointed out. ... "Yet that data we are worried about is sitting on their servers that they can access and it is going down their networks that they can watch."

The county's wastewater treatment department, he continued, which had been designated as critical infrastructure some time ago, has been working on increased security planning for the past two years and had approached him about fingerprinting employees a few months ago. The next step for Moffatt himself, he said, is to draft an administrative procedure outlining how the ordinance will be implemented. After that procedure has been drafted, a public hearing on the ordinance will be scheduled – after which the ordinance and administrative policy will be returned to the Board of Supervisors, with public comments attached to be considered for adoption.

An important additional consideration will be the impact of the ordinance on the county budget. "A fingerprint background check conducted by the Arizona Department of Public Safety costs the county \$24, and the new ordinance could require as many as 500 additional employees to undergo the checks," Moffatt wrote in an e-mail. He said

he expects to have the ordinance back to the board for a second vote sometime in February.

New Hampshire Division of Homeland Security Issues 2011 "Nuclear Calendars"

On Wednesday, 5 January 2011, the New Hampshire Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, working in cooperation with the Seabrook Station and Vermont Yankee nuclear power plants, issued the 2011 Nuclear Emergency Public Information Calendars for residents and businesses within the Emergency Planning Zones of the two power plants. Prominent among the information included on the calendars are instructions that would be needed in the event of a nuclear plant accident. That information covers, among other things, relevant data on sheltering, evacuation procedures and routes, and instructions on how citizens can protect themselves, their families, and their pets in the event of an emergency.

"We strongly encourage people to review this information and keep it available in case of an emergency," said Christopher M. Pope, director of the division. "The calendars focus on the nuclear plants, but the information they contain can be used in any type of emergency."

The New Hampshire communities within the Seabrook Station Emergency Planning Zone are Brentwood, East Kingston, Exeter, Greenland, Hampton, Hampton Falls, Kensington, Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newton, North Hampton, Portsmouth, Rye, Seabrook, South Hampton, and Stratham. The New Hampshire towns in the Vermont Yankee Emergency Planning Zone are Chesterfield, Hinsdale, Richmond, Winchester, and the Westport section of Swanzey.

Any resident or business within the Emergency Planning Zones of either plant who has not already received a calendar, and/ or who needs additional copies, may call the New Hampshire Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management at 1-800-852-3792.

Adam McLaughlin currently serves as the Manager of Emergency Readiness, Office of Emergency Management, for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. His responsibilities include both the development and coordination of Port Authority interagency all-hazards plans and the design and development of emergency preparedness exercises. A Certified Emergency Manager (CEM), he is a former U.S. Army officer – and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan – and a member of the Faculty of Senior Fellows for the Long Island University's Homeland Security Management Institute.











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